We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set of preference profiles into subsets with the property that all preference profiles in the same subset have the same Core. We also show how to identify a profile of (incomplete) binary relations containing the minimal information needed to generate as strict extensions all the (complete) preference profiles with the same Core. This is important for applications since it reduces the amount of information that agents have to reveal about their preference relations to centralized Core matching mechanisms; moreover, this reduction is maximal.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the invariance of the Core of ordinal many-to-one matching problems with respect to changes on firms' preference relations on subsets of workers. An ordinal many-to-one matching problem (a matching problem for short) consists of two non-empty and disjoint sets of agents: the set of firms (or institutions like schools, colleges, hospitals, etc.) and the set of workers (or individuals like children, students, medical interns, etc.). An allocation for a matching problem is a matching among firms and workers with the property that each worker can be matched to at most one firm and each firm is matched to a (possibly empty) subset of workers, keeping the bilateral nature of the relationships in the sense that if a worker is matched to a firm this firm is matched to a subset of workers that contains this worker. Each worker has a strict preference relation on the set of firms plus the prospect of remaining unmatched. Each firm has a strict preference relation on the set of all subsets of workers. A preference profile is a list of preference relations, one for each agent. The Core of a matching problem (at a given preference profile) is the set of matchings that are not blocked; namely, a matching belongs to the Core if there is no subset of agents (a coalition of firms and workers) such that, by rematching only among themselves, each agent gets a weakly better partner and at least one of them gets a strictly better one.
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The first result of the paper (Theorem 1) characterizes the family of equivalence classes of preference relations of each firm with the property that two preference relations are in the same class if and only if they have the same Core for all preference relations of the remaining agents. Our invariance result in Theorem 1 identifies those orderings between pairs of subsets of workers in a preference relation of a firm that, if inverted, the Core remains unchanged for all possible preference relations of the other agents. In other words, Theorem 1 identifies irrelevant changes on a preference relation of a firm that leave the Core invariant, irrespectively of the other agents' preference relations. The way of proceeding with this identification is as follows. Take a preference relation of a firm. First, construct the family of individually rational subsets of workers (a set of workers S belongs to the family if and only if the firm prefers the set S to all of its strict subsets). Second, define a binary relation on this family as follows: given two subsets of workers S and S in the family declare that S is preferred to S (according to the binary relation) if and only if S is the best subset (according to the original and complete preference relation of the firm) among all subsets of S ∪ S ; otherwise, the two subsets of workers are left unordered by the binary relation. Observe that in general this binary relation is not only defined on a subfamily of subsets of workers but it is also incomplete. It turns out that this binary relation can be used as the representative of one equivalence class of preference relations of the firm because all preference relations that share the same binary relation constructed as we just described have the property that the Core is the same regardless of the other agents' preference relations.
Theorem 1 extends and generalizes our previous result in Martínez et al. (2008) where we construct this invariant partition only for the subclass of substitutable preference profiles.
1 If the preference profile is substitutable the Core and the set of stable matchings coincide, are non-empty, and the binary relations obtained from the preference relations of the firms, as we have described above, are partial orders. In general, the binary relation used to represent the equivalence class formed by all preference relations of a firm that leave the Core invariant still relates too many pairs of subsets of workers. In centralized matching markets in which Core mechanisms (stable ones, whenever firms' preferences are substitutable) are used to suggest to the participants-after collecting and processing their preference relations-a matching in the Core, it would be very useful to use the smallest possible amount of information contained in the preference profile that still allows to compute a Core matching relative to this preference profile.
2 Thus, and in order to identify this minimal amount of information, we give a procedure to construct the minimal binary relation contained in the binary relation identified in Theorem 1, with the property that it still can generate all preference relations in the same equivalence class (that is, with the same Core) as their strict extensions. Furthermore, this binary relation is minimal in the sense that any strictly weaker (i.e., strictly contained) binary relation has at least two strict extensions that belong to different equivalence classes and thus have different Cores for some preference relations of the other agents.
Observe that the question of finding the minimal binary relation that can generate all equivalent preference relations was not even asked in Martínez et al. (2008) for the subclass of substitutable preference relations. Thus, the marginal contribution of this paper in relation to our former one is two-fold. We first extend the result of Theorem 1 from substitutable preference relations to any preference relation. Second, we identify for each preference relation (substitutable or not) the minimal binary relation that can be used as the representative of each equivalence class of preference relations with an invariant Core. This binary relation contains the indispensable and, at the same time, minimal information to generate the full class. Echenique (2008) answers a related question. Suppose we observe a set of matchings and we do not know agents' preference relations. Are there preference relations for the agents so that the observed sets of matchings are stable?
3 If yes, the set of matchings is said to be rationalizable. Echenique (2008) first shows that there are sets of matchings that are not rationalizable (and thus, the theory is testable) and second he identifies conditions that characterize the sets of matchings that are rationalizable: a necessary condition is that a certain graph has no odd cycles and a necessary and sufficient condition is in terms of no odd cycles and a certain system of polynomial inequalities. However, his results are different from ours in many respects. Echenique (2008) 's results apply only to the one-to-one matching model while ours apply to the more general many-to-one matching model. His results are in graph-theoretical terms and deal with the full preference profile by identifying how agents can rank potential partners given the set of matchings to be rationalizable. In contrast we identify, given a preference relation of a firm over subsets of workers (and independently of the other agents' preferences), those relations between pairs of subsets of workers that are critical from the point of view of the Core and those that are not. Before finishing this Introduction we want to emphasize that, besides their intrinsic interest, our invariance and minimality results have a relevant informational implication. They show that the amount of information about firms' preferences required to compute the set of Core matchings may be significantly smaller than the amount needed to describe their complete preference relations. This may be specially relevant for running direct preference revelation Core mechanisms in centralized entry-level professional labor markets. Moreover, our results may have computational and behavioral implications since they may simplify the task of computing the set of Core matchings as well as the analysis of the strategic behavior induced on firms by centralized Core matching mechanisms (in particular, to find either best-replies or unilateral deviations may be substantially easier). Finally, our results can be straightforwardly extended to the Core of ordinal many-to-many matching markets.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the notation, the basic definitions, and some preliminary results. In Section 3 we state and prove the invariance result for the set of Core matchings. In Section 4 we define the notions of minimal binary relation, strict extension and state and prove the minimality result. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude with final remarks, including a very preliminarily analysis of the computational aspect of our approach.
Preliminaries

Agents and preferences
Let W be the set of workers and let F be the set of firms. We assume that W and F are finite and disjoint. The set of agents is W ∪ F . Each worker w ∈ W has a preference relation P w on the set of firms plus the prospect of remaining unemployed. We assume that P w is strict. Specifically, P w is a complete, irreflexive, and transitive binary relation on F ∪ {∅}, where ∅ means that w is not hired by any firm. 4 Given P w , let R w be the weak preference relation on F ∪ {∅} induced by P w as follows: for f , f ∈ F ∪ {∅}, f R w f if and only if either f = f or f P w f . Then, R w is a complete, reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation on F ∪ {∅}.
5 Each firm f ∈ F has a preference relation P f on the family of all subsets of workers. We assume that P f is strict. Specifically, P f is a complete, irreflexive, and transitive binary relation on 2 W , where the empty set is interpreted as the prospect of not hiring any worker. Given firm f 's preference relation P f and a subset of workers S, Ch(S, P f ) denotes f 's most-preferred subset of S according to P f . Generically, we will refer to this set as the choice set. Given P f , let R f be the complete, reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive binary relation induced similarly on 2
is an |F | + |W |-tuple of preference relations, one for each agent. Given a preference profile P and f 's preference relation P f , we will denote by (P f , P − f ) the original preference profile P after replacing P f by P f and refer to P − f as a subprofile. Given a preference relation P f of firm f , the subsets of workers preferred to the empty set by f are called acceptable. Similarly, given a preference relation P w of worker w, the firms preferred to the empty set by w are called acceptable. By convention, we declare the empty set as being acceptable for all agents. Since the set of agents will be fixed throughout the paper, we identify a matching problem with a preference profile P .
Matchings and the Core
A matching assigns each firm to a subset of workers (possibly empty) and each worker to at most one firm, keeping the bilateral nature of the relationship; i.e., worker w works for firm f if and only if firm f hires worker w.
F ∪W with the properties:
F and |μ(w)| 1 for all w ∈ W ; and
If matching is voluntary it should be immune to any secession of a coalition of agents that, by matching only amongst themselves, could obtain better partners by breaking the former partnerships and creating new ones (a block). The Core is the set of matchings that are not blocked by any coalition of agents.
Definition 2. Let P be a preference profile and let μ be a matching. Coalition W ∪ F ⊆ W ∪ F blocks μ if there exists another matching μ such that:
4 A binary relation on X is (i) complete if for all x, y ∈ X such that x = y, either x y or y x, (ii) irreflexive if x ⊁ x for all x ∈ X , and (iii) transitive if for all x, y, z ∈ X such that x y z, x z holds. 5 A binary relation on X is (i) reflexive if x x for all x ∈ X and (ii) antisymmetric if, for all x, y ∈ X such that x y and y x, x = y holds.
and at least one of the weak preferences in (1) and (2) is strict.
Definition 3. Let P be a preference profile. A matching μ belongs to the Core (at P ) if it is not blocked by any coalition.
Denote by IR(P ) the set of individually rational matchings at P . A matching μ is pair-wise stable (at P ) if there is no unmatched pair (w, f ) ∈ W × F such that f P w μ(w) and w ∈ Ch(μ( f ) ∪ {w}, P f ). The set of stable matchings (at P ) is the set of individually rational matchings that are pair-wise stable. Let S(P ) denote the set of stable matchings (at P ) and let C (P ) denote the set of matchings in the Core (at P ). Obviously, C (P ) ⊆ S(P ) for all P . It is well known that there are preference profiles for which the Core (and the set of stable matchings) is empty. Kelso and Crawford (1982) proposed (in a more general many-to-one matching model) a condition on the preference relations of firms, called substitutability, with the property that if in a profile P all firms have substitutable preference relations then the Core is non-empty and coincides with the set of stable matchings. For this reason substitutability has played a central role in the analysis of many-to-one matching models.
Definition 4.
A firm f 's preference relation P f satisfies substitutability if for any set S containing workers w and w
Substitutability precludes strong complementarities among workers since it requires that the desirability of a worker w in a particular set S does not come exclusively from the presence of another worker w in that set; i.e., the firm still wants to hire worker w even though worker w is not available anymore; thus, w is a good worker (in the context of the set S) not only because of the presence of w . A preference profile P is substitutable if for each firm f , the preference relation P f satisfies substitutability. Let S be the set of substitutable preference profiles. For any substitutable preference profile P ∈ S, C (P ) = S(P ) = ∅. However, there are non-substitutable preference profiles P for which C (P ) = ∅.
Extracting binary relations from firms' preferences
Consider a preference relation of a firm on the family of all subsets of workers. Our objective is to distinguish among all orderings between pairs of subsets of workers those that are irrelevant for the Core from those that are relevant in the following sense. Take S and S and assume that S P f S . Consider a new preference relation P f with the property that it coincides with P f except that S P f S. Then either
which case the ordering between S and S is irrelevant for the Core) or else there exists at least one P − f such that
which case the ordering is relevant). To attain this objective we proceed by first selecting from the family of all subsets of workers a subfamily on which we will then define a binary relation that keeps only the relevant orderings (from the point of view of the Core) between subsets of workers. But before, we need some additional notions and notation.
Let A be a non-empty subfamily of subsets of W containing the empty set; i.e., A ⊆ 2 W and ∅ ∈ A. A partial order on A is a reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation on A. Observe that weak preference relations of firms are complete partial orders on 2 W . Given a binary relation on A, let be the antireflexive and transitive binary relation on A induced by on A as follows: for S, S ∈ A, S S if and only if S S and S = S . A binary relation
on A has a maximal element on B ⊆ A if there exists S ∈ B such that for all S ∈ B with S = S, S S holds where is induced by . Then, given a preference relation P f and a set S ∈ 2 W , P f has a maximal element on the family of all subsets of S. We have denoted this set by Ch(S, P f ) and called it the choice set of S according to P f ; namely, Ch(S, P f )P f S for all S ∈ 2 S \ Ch(S, P f ).
It will be useful to understand (and to denote) a binary relation on A as a subset of A × A; namely, for all S, T ∈ A, (S, T ) ∈ ⊆ A × A if and only if S T . Hence, for two binary relations and on A the notation ⊆ means that if S, S ∈ A and S S then, S S . After these preliminaries we now turn to define the procedure to delete from the preference relation of a firm the orderings between those pairs of subsets of workers that are irrelevant with respect to the set of matchings in the Core. First, subsets that are not the choice set of themselves can be left unordered since no matching in the Core, regardless of the other agents' preference relations, matches this firm with any of these subsets. Formally, given the preference relation P f on 2 W , define the family A P f of individually rational subsets of workers relative to P f as the collection of sets that are choice sets of themselves; that is,
Second, some pairs of subsets of workers in A P f will be left unordered. Specifically, define the binary relation P f on A P f obtained from P f as follows: for all S, S ∈ A P f ,
S P f S if and only if
Again, the binary relation P f on A P f leaves as unordered (i) all sets in 2 W that are not the choice of themselves and
(ii) those pairs of sets in A P f whose union contains a set that is preferred to each of the two sets. 7 Martínez et al. (2008) show that if P f is substitutable then P f is a partial order on A P f and (A P f , P f ) is a semilattice; namely, for every S, S ∈ A P f , lub P f {S, S } ∈ A P f (where, given a family of subsets T , lub P f T is the least upper bound of T ). Example 1 below shows that if P f is not substitutable then the binary relation P f may not be transitive.
Example 1. Let W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 , w 5 } be the set of workers and let f be a firm. Consider the preference relation
where we only list acceptable subsets of workers in decreasing order of preference. Observe that P f is not substitutable
Moreover, the family of individually rational subsets of workers relative to P f is A P f = {{w 1 , w 5 }, {w 1 , w 2 }, {w 3 , w 4 }, {w 4 , w 5 }, {∅}} and
Thus, the binary relation P f is not transitive and
Example 1 shows that the binary relation P f may be incomplete on A P f (both {w 1 , w 2 } P f {w 4 , w 5 } and {w 4 , w 5 } P f {w 1 , w 2 } hold) and that it may not inherit the transitivity of P f . Nevertheless, Remarks 1 and 2 below establish that the binary relation P f inherits some other properties from the preference relation P f . Remark 1. Let S, S ∈ A P f be such that S P f S . Then, S R f S .
Remark 2. The binary relation P f on A P f is reflexive, antisymmetric, acyclic, and has a maximal element on A P f .
The invariance result
Theorem 1 below gives a simple procedure to partition the set of firm f 's preference relations into equivalence classes where each class contains exactly those preference relations for which the set of Core matchings is invariant regardless of the other agents' preference relations. Theorem 1 says that an equivalence class is composed of all firm f 's preference relations for which the binary relations obtained from them coincide. Theorem 1. Let P f and P f be two preference relations on 2 W . Then,
Proof. (⇒) Let P f and P f be two preference relations such that
Define P = (P f , P − f ) and let (F , W , μ ) be a block of μ at P . By (3), there exist f ∈ F and S ⊆ W such that μ ( f ) = S and for all v ∈ { f } ∪ S ,
and there exists v ∈ { f } ∪ S such that
If f = f , by (4) and (5)
Hence, and since A P f = A P f , we can assume without loss of generality that
Consider any matchingμ with the property thatμ( (4) and R w = R w . This contradicts the hypothesis that μ ∈ C (P f , P − f ).
(⇐) Let P f and P f be such that
(by symmetry, this will suffice). Consider the following subprofile P − f : for all w ∈ S, all w / ∈ S, and allf = f ,
Consider the following preference profile P − f : for all w ∈ S 1 ∪ S 2 , all w / ∈ S 1 ∪ S 2 , and allf = f ,
Let μ be the matching where μ( f ) = S 1 , μ(f ) = ∅ for allf = f , and μ(w ) = ∅ for all w /
and for all w ∈ Ch(S 1 ∪ S 2 , P f ),
An alternative way of describing Theorem 1 in terms of the Core correspondence is as follows. For a firm f and its preference relation P f denote by T f ,P f the Core mapping that takes as arguments all subprofiles of preferences P − f of workers and remaining firms and such that T f ,P f (P − f ) = C (P f , P − f ). Theorem 1 partitions the set of preference relations of firm f into equivalence classes such that all preference relations in a class have the same Core mapping.
The minimality result
An implication of Theorem 1 is that an incomplete binary relation can be used as the representative of each equivalence class of all preference relations of a firm that leave the Core invariant. In general, the amount of information contained in the incomplete binary relation is substantially smaller than the one contained in any of its associated preference relations. However, this binary relation still contains redundant information (some pairs of subsets of workers are unnecessarily ordered) since the same equivalence class could be recovered by extending appropriately a strictly weaker binary relation. Example 2 below illustrates this fact and how we will proceed. Example 2. Let W = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 } be the set of workers and let f be a firm. Consider the preference relation P f on 2
Observe that A P f = 2 W . Obviously, S P f S for all S ∈ A P f . In addition, P f consists of the following orderings:
From the point of view of the Core, the only relevant information contained in P f (together with the fact that A P f = 2 W ) is that the best subset of workers is W itself (this is true as long as we extend the binary relation by making sure that if one set of workers is strictly contained in another set then, the larger set is strictly preferred to the smaller one in the extension). The relative orderings among subsets of cardinality two and the relative orderings among subsets of cardinality one are irrelevant for the set of Core matchings. For instance, in this case the three preference relations P f , P f , and P f defined by
Indeed, we will show that from the information conveyed by the fact that A P f = 2 W and the much weaker (and minimal) binary relation m P f = {∅}, where no pair of subsets of workers are related, we will be able to extract the class of (complete) 
as what we will call strict extensions. Our results will say that
On the other hand, if we had left the two subsets {w 1 } and {w 3 } unordered we could have found two strict extensionsP f andP f with the property that C (P f , P − f ) = C (P f , P − f ) for some subprofile P − f ; in this sense the binary relation
on AP f will be called minimal.
In the sequel we define a minimal binary relation that will declare as unordered (i) any two subsets of workers with the property that one is a strict subset of the other and (ii) any two subsets of workers whose relative ordering (for instance, S P f S ) could be obtained by transitivity (i.e., S and S will be left unordered whenever there exists S ∈ A P f such that S P f S P f S ). In this section we identify the minimal binary relation (weaker than the one used as the representative of the class) with the following two properties: (i) all preference relations in the class can be obtained from this minimal binary relation by what we call a strict extension, and (ii) any strictly weaker binary relation has at least two strict extensions that belong to two different equivalence classes.
Transitive closure
To make the proof of Theorem 2 below simpler, we will now first enlarge P f with its transitive closure Notice that the all-relation on A × A is transitive and contains all binary relations on A. The intersection of transitive binary relations on A is again transitive; that is, given ,
is transitive} is transitive. Finally, let be an acyclic binary relation on A. Then,
Before proceeding we state and prove a lemma that will be useful in the sequel.
Lemma 1. Let P f be a preference relation on 2
W and assume that S
is antisymmetric as well. Thus, S 1 = S 2 . 2
Minimal binary relation
To identify the minimal binary relation associated to the preference relation P f of firm f we proceed as follows. First, obtain A P f . Second, compute P f and its transitive closure . Formally, Definition 6. Let P f be a preference relation on 2 W . The binary relation
S the following condition holds:
(mi) S S if and only if S ∩ S / ∈ {S, S } and there does not exist S ∈ A P f \ {S, S } such that, 
is transitive by definition, this implies that
Alternatively, we could directly define m P f ⊆ P f replacing condition (mi) in Definition 6 above by (mi ) S S if and only if S ∩ S / ∈ {S, S } and there does not exist S ∈ A P f \ {S, S } such that, S P f S P f S .
However, the arguments would become more involved since instead of using the transitivity of
we should use the acyclicity of P f by identifying (and working with) sequences S 1 P f · · · P f S k with the property that S k P f S 1 .
Strict extension
We next give a procedure to obtain from the minimal binary relation all preference relations that would generate it. The procedure consists of completing the acyclic minimal binary relation by declaring a set in the family to be (strictly) preferred to all its subsets and if a set is not in the family of individually rational subsets of workers then it must have a strict subset that belongs to the family and is strictly preferred to it. Formally, Definition 7. Let be an acyclic binary relation on A ⊂ 2 W with ∅ ∈ A. The (strict) preference relation P f on 2
Definition 7 can be seen as a set of instructions on how to extend an acyclic binary relation on A to a preference relation on 2 W . First, it preserves all the ordered pairs (this corresponds to the standard notion of an extension used by Szpilrajn, 1930) . Second, a set is preferred to all its subsets. Third, if a set is not in A then, we have freedom on how to order it but the set has to be worse than one of its subsets (perhaps the empty set). Finally, all the remaining pairs that are not ordered by the acyclic binary relation can be freely ordered by the preference relation (this is one of the reasons of why in general there are many strict extensions of an acyclic binary relation). Before proceeding, we state and prove two results: Lemma 3 will be useful in the proof of Theorem 2 below and Lemma 4 states that indeed P f is obtained as a strict extension of Proof. We consider separately the three cases in Definition 7. For the first two, let S 1 , S 2 ∈ A P f be such that S 1 = S 2 .
(se.2) Assume S 2 S 1 . To obtain a contradiction, assume Before proving Theorem 2 two remarks are in order. First, the statement of Theorem 2 implicitly contains the following procedure that we want to make explicit before we proceed to its proof. Given a preference relation P f on 2 W , construct the family A P f of individually rational subsets of workers relative to P f . From A P f , obtain sequentially the binary relation We now turn to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. We first prove that A P f
Assume S / ∈ A P f . Hence, and since P f is a strict extension of
, by (se.3), there existsŜ ∈ A P f such thatŜ S and
and S = Ch(S, P f ). Let S S be such that S = Ch(S, P f ). Obviously, S = Ch(S , P f ) and S P f S.
Thus, S ∈ A P f . Hence, and since we have already proved that A P f
S . By Lemma 3, S P f S , a contradiction with (9).
Second, to prove P f = P f we will show that for all
By Lemma 3,
Theorem 3 below states that m P f is indeed minimal in the sense that any strictly weaker binary relation generates, as one of its strict extensions, a preference relation of firm f that belongs to a different equivalence class of the one to which P f belongs to and thus, with a different Core for some subprofile P − f . 
Final remarks
We finish the paper with four remarks. First, our approach has focused only on preference relations of firms. Hence, one may ask whether a symmetric analysis could be performed from the point of view of the workers. The answer is yes, although the analysis is trivial. Given a preference relation of a worker, we could similarly construct its corresponding binary relation on the set of acceptable firms. However, this binary relation on the set of acceptable firms coincides with the initial complete preference relation (on the set of acceptable firms) since the best firm of the union of two different firms is always equal to the best of the two firms. Thus, from the point of view of the workers' preference relations all orderings (between pairs of acceptable firms) are relevant for the set of Core matchings. This is the reason why preference relations of workers have remained fixed while we identified equivalence classes of preference relations of firms.
Second, an analogous literature in multi-unit auctions has evolved during the last years wondering about the complexity for bidders of revealing their valuations of all subsets of objects (see for instance Milgrom, 2009 ). However, this literature applies to settings where bidders have cardinal preference relations on objects and/or subsets of objects. Then, bids are related to valuations on those. In contrast here, as in a large literature on two-sided matching models, we consider agents with ordinal preference relations.
Third, our results extend to the same partial orders in many-to-many matching markets since the proofs of Theorems 1, 2 and 3 can be translated straightforwardly to the setting where preferences of workers are defined on 2 F instead of F ∪ {∅} and matchings are many-to-many instead of many-to-one. Then our analysis can also be used to identify equivalence classes of preference relations of workers (on all subsets of firms) leaving invariant the set of Core matchings.
Fourth, we preliminarily address the computational aspect of our approach. 9 Given an arbitrary preference relation P f , to obtain its family of individually rational subset of workers A P f and its minimal binary relation m P f may be a complex task, difficult to describe by a simple and systematic procedure. However, whenever the preference relation P f is substitutable the first goal becomes easier.
10
Assume P f is substitutable. We ask the following question: is there any simple and systematic procedure to compute the family of individually rational subsets of workers A P f ? We answer the question affirmatively by defining an algorithm that computes A P f .
Algorithm
Input: A substitutable preference relation P f on 2
W .
Initialization: Set T 0 = 2 W and A 0 = ∅.
Step 1. Given T 0 = ∅ and A 0 obtain S = Ch(W , P f ). Define the families of subsets of workers
If T 1 = ∅ stop and let A 1 be the outcome of the algorithm; otherwise go to Step 2.
Step k. Given T k−1 = ∅ and A k−1 , take S ∈ T k−1 with the property that #S #S for all S ∈ T k−1 and obtain S = Ch(S , P f ). Define the families of subsets of workers
If T k = ∅ stop and let A k be the outcome of the algorithm; otherwise go to Step k + 1. 9 What follows has to be seen as a first step towards a more general and systematic analysis that is left for future research. 10 Although restrictive, we think that our analysis still has interest because substitutability is a plausible restriction in settings where workers exhibit low complementarities in shaping firms' preference relations on 2 W ; this is the reason why a very large proportion of the literature on ordinal many-to-one matching models assumes that firms have substitutable preference relations or even stronger conditions like responsiveness.
Observe that the algorithm can be understood as a set of simple and precise instructions given to the firm to compute A P f . Although it takes as input the preference relation P f on 2 W , it tries to minimize the number of times that the firm has to be asked about how it orders pairs of subsets of workers and it only requires that the firm has three abilities. Given any subset of workers, the firm is able to calculate its cardinality, to compute its subsets, and to identify its most-preferred subset.
The algorithm has several executions depending on the particular subsets S ∈ T k−1 with largest cardinality chosen at each step k > 1, if any. The table below illustrates a particular execution of the algorithm for the following substitutable preference relation (in the table we omit brackets and commas when writing subsets of workers; for instance, w 2 w 3 should be read as {w 2 , w 3 }):
